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SUPREME COURT PREVIEW

Police Under the Gun
Search and seizure on the docket amid tensions over police conduct
BY RICHARD C. REUBEN
Somewhere, Justice William
0. Douglas must be feeling vindicated.
Back in 1968, after all, the
irascible liberal who served on the
Court more than 35 years before his
death in 1980 had warned in a dissenting opinion in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, that the Court was
opening a Pandora's box by eschewing the traditional "probable cause"
standard for Fourth Amendment
search and seizures in traffic stop
cases, and permitting warrantless
detentions based merely on "reasonable suspicion."
"To allow less [than probable
cause] would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice," the great
dissenter insisted.
More than a quarter-century
later, the confusion over the "reasonable suspicion" approach is still
commanding the Supreme Court's
attention. A pair of cases on the
justices' argument calendar this
spring address the tension between
legitimate traffic stops and those
based on pretext.
Whren v. United States, No.
95-5841, argued April 17, addresses
a split in the federal circuit courts
over the very meaning of reasonable suspicion. Whren arises from a
drug arrest of a black man following an initial stop-purportedly for
obstructing traffic and turning without signaling-in an area known
for drug sales. His lawyers argued
unsuccessfully in the lower courts
that the traffic stop was just an excuse to determine whether he was
involved in illegal drug sales.
Several circuits have upheld
such stops as long as any reasonable police officer "would have"
made them. Several others, including the District of Columbia Circuit
in Whren, have taken a more permissive approach, upholding stops
if a reasonable police officer "could
have" made them.
The other case, argued March
26, tests whether appellate courts
should defer to trial court rulings
Richard C. Reuben, a lawyer,
is a reporterfor the ABA Journal.
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on these issues or review them de
novo. Ornelas v. United States, No.
95-5257, stems from the search of a
car's door panel for drugs. The 7th
Circuit at Chicago ruled in favor of
deferential review.
"There is a great deal of confusion," says Professor Yale Kamisar
of the University of Michigan Law
School in Ann Arbor. "Probable
cause has been diluted to the point
where the police can detain if there
is less than a 50 percent chance

(See "When Good Cops Go Bad,"
May 1996 ABA Journal,page 62.)
"I don't think that the tension
we're seeing is of recent origin,"
says Charles Thomas, a criminologist at the University of Florida in
Gainesville, but the King case
"blew the lid off' concerns and anxieties that previously had been
muted, and made police-community
relations a public issue.
Routine traffic stops are a likely point for these pressures to erupt
because they are
so common, so dangerous for police,
and often are the
most significant
contact that many
Americans have
with law enforcement. And minorities may well be
more inclined to
view these stops as
reminders of the
general distrust
with which they
are too frequently
viewed by white
society.
"The reason
this is so controSubjectivity of search criteria has invited wid espread criticism. versial is because
police often use
that crime is afoot, and reasonable traffic stops as a pretext for stopsuspicion means something less ping someone who may be 'in the
than that, but more than a mere wrong neighborhood,' driving 'too
hunch. Well, what does that fancy' of a car, or who may just 'look
suspicious,' " says Carol Watson of
mean?"
This term's cases give the jus- Manes & Watson in Los Angeles,
tices an opportunity to clear up that who represents civilians in police
misconduct claims.
disarray.
Ordinarily, this should be easy
Thomas says, "The ability of
work for the conservative Rehn- police to do their jobs efficiently
quist Court, which has been very and effectively presupposes a high
cool to the claims of criminal defen- level of community support and codants over the years. Indeed, the operation. If everyone becomes disgovernment won both cases, mean- trustful of the police, or worse yet,
ing the justices didn't have to take fearful of them, you create a danthem to reach a pro-government re- gerous vacuum in between law ensult. So why bother?
forcement and the public in which
everyone loses."
A Pressure Point for Tensions
Watson and other critics say
The answer may lie as much in the Supreme Court has played a
the times as it does in the law. Ten- central role in encouraging such acsions between police departments tivities by giving too much deferand the communities they serve ence to police. Perhaps the Court
have been high since the Rodney will use this term's cases to reconKing case in Los Angeles captured sider the outer boundaries of that
national headlines five years ago. deference.
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